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INTRODUCTION

A fundamental federal income taxation query asks, who is the
taxpayer? The issue has arisen in the sale-leaseback context, with
courts attempting to identify the substantive owner of property and
thus the party entitled to depreciation deductions.' The question has

*Of Jennifer R. Newsom Professional Association. J.D., University of Toledo; LL.M. (Taxation), 1989, University of Florida.
1. See, e.g., Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978) (finding the taxpayer
to be the owner and not just the financier of depreciable property leased back to the prior
owner by applying substance-over-form analysis); Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Commissioner,
752 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1985) (disallowing depreciation deductions for computer equipment, pur-
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arisen when corporate tax rates were lower than personal rates,
prompting individual service providers to form corporations to perform
services the taxpayers formerly conducted in their individual
capacities. 2 Finally, the issue has arisen in the 3context of corporate
agents, sometimes called "dummy corporations.
The tax effect of using a "controlled corporate agent" is the subject
of this paper. Statutes and case law have failed to define precisely
"controlled corporate agent." The term, however, generally refers to
a corporation formed merely to act as the agent of its shareholders
or another entity in which the shareholders possess an ownership
interest. 4 A number of bona fide business reasons necessitate the use
of a corporate agent.5 For example, lenders seeking to avoid state
usury law limitations on loans to noncorporate borrowers may require
that such debtors form a corporation. Typically, in these cases, individuals engaged in real estate development and management operate
through a partnership for flexibility and for the tax benefit resulting
from the flow-through of initial lossesA In response to the lender's

chased by the taxpayer at an inflated purchase price, paid primarily with nonrecourse debt,
and subsequently leased back to the prior owner, because the transaction had no economic
substance). See also Cliff & Levine, Reflections on Ownership - Sales and Pledgesof Installment
Obligations, 39 TAX LAW. 37 (1985) (examining factors used to determine ownership); Note,
Tax Aspects of the Nominee Corporation:Roccaforte v. Commissioner, 22 TULSA L.J. 61 (1986)
(examining disagreement among circuit courts as to the appropriate theory to use in determining
whether corporation is a nominee).
2. See, e.g., Keller v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1014, 1030 (1981), affld, 723 F.2d 58 (198:3).
As the result of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, enacted on October 22, 1986, the maximum
corporate marginal tax rate increased to 34%, generally effective after December 31, 1987.
I.R.C. § 11(b) (1986). At the same time, the maximum marginal rate, for example, for single
individuals decreased to 28%. I.R.C. § 1(c) (1986). Although these marginal rates might be
increased by 5% under certain circumstances, the flip-flop in maximum corporate versus
maximum individual rates, in principle, is unaffected. See I.R.C. §§ 1(g), 11(b) (1986).
3. See, e.g., Raphan v. United States, 759 F.2d 879 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
843 (1985) (upholding for federal income tax purposes, taxpayers' disregard of the corporation
they formed solely to hold nominal legal title to property). See generally Falk, Nominees,
Dummies and Agents: Is it Time for the Supreme Court to Take Another Look?, 63 TAXES
725 (1985) (reviewing distinction between nominees, dummies and agents and implications of
each); Miller, The Nominee Conundrum: The Live Dummy is Dead, but the Dead Dummy
Should Live, 34 TAx L. REV. 213 (1979) (examining evolution of tax cases involving dummy
corporations); Riess, Supreme Court Provides Safe Harborfor Use of Straw Corporations, 16
J. REAL EST. TAX'N 99 (1989) (noting that a corporate agent is no more than a formalism);
see infra notes 4-14 and accompanying text.
4. Raphan v. United States, 3 Cl. Ct. 457, 462 (1983).
5. See Riess, supra note 3, at 99-100; Note, Recent Developments in the Federal Tax Law
Treatment of Nominee Corporations, 13 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 361 (1985).
6. See Rands, OrganizationsClassified as Corporationsfor Federal Tax Purposes, 59 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 657, 694-95 (1985).
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requirement of a corporate borrower, the individuals form a "C" corporation to hold title to acquired real estate, sign loan documents,
and execute other documents in connection with real estate transactions. 7 Generally, parties to these transactions are aware that the
corporation is holding title to the real estate and executing documents
in only a nominal capacity."
In other instances, a taxpayer may wish to engage in a transaction
as an undisclosed principal to avoid attracting undue attention which
could interfere, for example, with negotiations in purchasing property.
Conversely, in the sale of property, individuals may desire a corporate
nominee to ease title conveyance problems or management when various persons have ownership interests. 9 "S" corporations may not be
an option because of the various prerequisites to qualifying for "S"
status and possible limitations on the current utilization of losses. 0
When the principal is unrelated to the corporate agent, the corresponding tax effect is akin to that of a flow-through entity.", That is,

7. For an explanation of the term "'C' corporation," see infra note 10.
8. See, e.g., George v. Commissioner, 844 F.2d 225, 229 (5th Cir. 1988) (partners in the
principal/partnership were aware that title to real estate beneficially owned by the partnership
was held in nominee capacity by a corporate agent and the various creditors of the partnership
were also aware of the nominee or agency arrangement); Roccaforte v. Commissioner, 708 F.2d
986, 987 (5th Cir. 1983) (mortgagees advised by letter that corporation held title to mortgaged
real estate solely in nominee capacity).
9. See Riess, supra note 3, at 99-100.
10. "S" corporations are specially defined in I.R.C. § 1361 (1986) and governed by subchapter
S and, to the extent consistent with subchapter S, subchapter C of Chapter 1 of subtitle A of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. I.R.C. § 1371(a) (1986). All other corporations, commonly
called "C" corporations, are governed by subchapter C, and thus are separately taxable on
income earned pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 11(a) (1986). Although the term "corporation" is not
defined within the Internal Revenue Code, examples of entities possibly falling within the
classification of corporation are given in I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3) (1986). See also Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159 (1976) (discussing characteristics that define corporations and holding that
an organization will be taxed as a corporation if it possesses more characteristics of a corporation
than not).
The advantage of qualifying as an "S" corporation is that, generally, the corporation's items
of income and loss are passed through to the shareholders without recognition at the corporate
level. I.R.C. §§ 1363(a), 1366 (1986). The disadvantages include the inability to have more than
thirty-five shareholders, more than one class of stock, and nonindividuals as shareholders. I.R.C.
§ 1361 (1986). More significantly, the current pass through of losses is limited, again, generally
speaking, to the equity or debt provided by the shareholder, as adjusted for prior items of
income or loss. See I.R.C. §§ 1366(d), 1367 (1986). See generally Note, The Use of Corporations
in Real Estate Transactions:Judicial Acceptance of the Agency Theory, 8 J. CORP. L. 361,
385 (1983) (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of subchapter S corporations in real
estate endeavors).
11. See Commissioner v. Bollinger, 485 U.S. 340 (1988); Rands, supra note 6, at 694-95.
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the Internal Revenue Service (the "Service") taxes the principal on
income produced or losses incurred in connection with the agent's
activities on behalf of the principal, without recognition to the agent.
When the principal holds a controlling interest in the corporate agent,
however, the principal-agent structure is exposed to challenge under
the NationalCarbide Corp. v. Commissioner line of cases regardless
of the legitimacy of the business purpose. 13 Under this line of cases,
the alleged agency relationship is subject to special scrutiny. The
National Carbide line of cases address the concern that a principal
with a controlling interest might choose to regard or disregard the
14
agency relationship depending solely upon the tax consequences.
National Carbide,the 1949 watershed case decided by the Supreme
Court, involved taxpayer claims that income earned by subsidiary
corporations was taxable solely to the parent corporation pursuant to
an agency relationship. 15 The Court articulated a new six-factors test
in determining whether the taxpayer's use of a controlled corporate
agent reflected a "true agency relationship." Applying this test, the
Court refused to find such a relationship and reallocated the parent
corporation's disputed income to the subsidiaries. 16
After National Carbide, taxpayers struggled to force a fit between
their business needs for a corporate agent and the National Carbide
six-factors test. 17 In addition, the lower courts' application of the test

12. 336 U.S. 422 (1949).
13. See Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 438-39 (1943); see also
Ourisman v. Commissioner, 760 F.2d 541, 548-49 (4th Cir. 1985) (stating that while the court
was sympathetic to the taxpayer's need for a corporate agent, it was compelled, nonetheless,
to determine whether the alleged agency relationship could exist independently of the corporation
shareholder relationship). Ourismanwas decided before the Supreme Court decision in the case
of Commissioner v. Bollinger, 108 S. Ct. 1173 (1988), wherein the Court suggested that the
corporation-shareholder relationship should not preclude, per se, an agency relationship between
corporate agent and its owner-principal. Id. at 1177. Whether the Court intended to abandon
the requirement that the agency relationship exist independently of the control exercised over
the corporate agent by the owner principal, however, is not clear. See infra notes 133-37.
14. See Bollinger,108 S. Ct. at 1178-79 (1988); Ourisman, 760 F.2d at 549 (4th Cir. 1985).
15. National Carbide, 336 U.S. at 426.
16. Id. at 434-39. See infra note 55 and accompanying text for National Carbide'ssix-factors test.
17. See, e.g., Raphan v. United States, 759 F.2d 879 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 843 (1985). In an attempt to satisfy the National Carbide requirements, some of which
include transmission of receipts by the corporate agent to the principal and the authority to
bind the principal to obligations with third parties, taxpayers often executed agency agreements
containing provisions tailored specifically to the National Carbide criteria. For an example of
a typical agency agreement, see Raphan v. United States, 3 Cl. Ct. 457, n.2 (1983), affd in
part, rev'd in part, 759 F.2d 879 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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varied widely. Some courts elevated one factor over another,' while
others applied the test rigidly by requiring the presence of circumstances satisfying all six listed criteria. 9
In response to these disparate holdings, in March of 1988, the
United States Supreme Court decided the case of Bollinger v. Commissioner,20 addressing once again whether a taxpayer can treat a
corporation in which it has a controlling interest as an agent with
corresponding tax effect. 21 The facts in Bollinger involved the typical
scenario whereby a partnership engaged in real estate development
forms a corporation solely to arrange financing for the partnership
activities.2 While not addressing completely the proper application of
the National Carbide factors, the Court did refuse "to parse the text
of National Carbideas though that were itself the governing statute."2
Instead, the Court relied upon the presence of three circumstances
to find a "true agency."
Nonetheless, the question remains after Bollinger whether the
Court intended to replace the NationalCarbidetest and, if so, whether
the tax effect for taxpayers compelled by business necessity to use a
corporate agent is any more certain."
For taxpayers forced to use a corporate agent business structure,
the tax cost of a successful challenge to the validity of an alleged
agency relationship could be disastrous. The reallocation of losses from
the alleged principal, often a pass-through entity, to the alleged agent,

18. See infra notes 98-114 and accompanying text; see also Seto & Glimcher, When Will a
Related Corporate Nominee Be a Partnership'sAgent?, 68 J. TAX'N 380, 381 (1988) (analyzing
three-part Bollinger test for controlled corporate agents); Note, Recent Developments in the
Federal Tax Law Treatment of Nominee Corporations, 13 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 361, 380-83
(1985) (reviewing appellate and tax court decisions on tax treatment of nominee corporations)
[hereinafter Recent Developments].
19. See, e.g., Moncrief v. United States, 730 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1984).
20. 108 S. Ct. 1173 (1988).
21. Id. at 1175-76.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1179.
24. See inzfra text accompanying note 149.
25. See generally Seto & Glimcher, supra note 18, at 385 (suggesting that the "lesson to
be learned from Bollinger is that the line between an agent and a controlled corporation is best
defined on a case-by-case basis, in the frustrating but time honored common law tradition.").
But see Liebmann, Disregardingthe Corporate Nominee: Commissioner v. Bollinger, 42 TAx
LAW. 371, 378 (1989) (concluding National Carbide factors no longer determinative); Riess,
supra note 3, at 99 (finding the Bollinger decision to provide "clear guidance" in the controlled

corporate agent context).
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often a "C" corporation, 26 could result in the permanent loss of deductions, assessment of deficiencies, and possibly penalties.Y
Given the importance of the business structure to attending tax
consequences, a rule of law with the potential for such consequences
should have clearer parameters. 2s This paper, then, has a threefold
purpose: first, to examine the National Carbide decision and the tax
law environment in which it was decided; second, to illustrate the ad
hoc results of applying the National Carbide factors even as modified
by Bollinger; and third, to suggest an approach which focuses on
section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as amended (the
"Code"),- supplemented by judicial doctrines as necessary.

26. For an explanation of the term "C" corporation, see supra note 10.
27. See, e.g., O'Neal v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 1347 (1989); see also infra notes
149-57 and accompanying text.
"S" corporations aside, corporate losses are deductible by the corporation only; generally,
the shareholders receive no current tax benefit from a corporation's operating losses. B. BI'rKER
& J. EusTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS
1.07 (abr. 5th ed. 1987). See also Rands, supra note 6 (noting that expenses and losses incurred
by the alleged corporate agent in connection with activities on behalf of, for example, a partnership-principal, often are desired by the partners as current deductions against other income).
However, effective, generally, for tax years beginning after December 31, 1986, is I.R.C. § 469
(1986). Generally speaking, section 469 prevents certain taxpayers, including individuals, from
deducting a net loss from activities in which they do not "materially participate," with material
participation defined generally in Internal Revenue Code § 469(h) as involvement in the operations of an "activity" on a "regular, continuous, and substantial" basis. Specific requirements
which -must be met before a taxpayer is treated as materially participating in an activity are
set forth in Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T. The general effect of § 469 is to prevent a taxpayer
from currently using a net loss from activities in which he is not a material participant (passive
activities) as a deduction against earned income, such as wages, or other kinds of nonpassive
income. See I.R.C. §§ 469(a)-(e) (1986). Section 469 may act as an impediment to corporate
agent structures motivated solely by a desire for the tax benefit of a pass-through of losses
attributed from the corporate agent to the principal partnership.
Various assessments, including interest, additions to tax, and penalties will be imposed upon
a taxpayer who fails to pay timely the amount of tax due, even if the correct amount is
determined beyond the due date as the result of protracted litigation with the Commissioner.
See I.R.C. § 6601-6711 (1986). Depending upon the taxpayer's intent, willfulness, and knowledge
of the underpayment of tax, the taxpayer may be subject to criminal penalties. See I.R.C. §§
7201-7216 (1986).
28. Cf. Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159 (1976) (suggesting the desirability of giving
courts more leeway in balancing factors if entity will be taxed as a corporation).
29. Section 482 states, in pertinent part, as follows:
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or
not incorporated, whether or not organized in the United States, and whether or
not affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the
Secretary may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits,
or allowances between or among such organizations, trades, or businesses, if he
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II. THE BIRTH OF THE NATIONAL CARBIDE LINE OF CASES
The National Carbide decision has produced uncertainty for taxpayers and stirred controversy among commentators since the Supreme Court decided it some forty years ago.30 Because the Bollinger
Court failed to overrule National Carbide and its progeny, these cases
still stand as the law governing recognition of a business structure
using a controlled corporate agent.3 1 Therefore, an analysis of the
National Carbide line of cases must begin with a close examination
of the decision that spawned the controversy.
A.

The Question of Valid Agency Status Distinguished From That
of Separate Taxable Status

The Supreme Court based the National Carbide decision in part
on its prior decision in Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner.-2
Moline Properties stands for the proposition that a corporation is a
separate taxable entity whenever it engages in business activity. 3 In
Moline Properties,an individual formed a corporation, at the insistence
of a creditor, to hold mortgaged property. By forming a corporation,
the individual could pledge the stock as security for an additional loan
to the incorporator. 4 Thereafter, the corporation engaged in some
land use litigation, leasing activities, and property sales.-" The sole
shareholder sought to report the income from these activities on his
personal income tax return by disregarding the corporation. The taxpayer claimed the corporation was merely his agent because of his
status as sole shareholder, without relying upon any traditional indicia
of an agency relationship. 36 While not foreclosing the possibility that

determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order
to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of such organizations, trades, or businesses.
I.R.C. § 482 (1986).
30. See Falk, supra note 3, at 725 (noting a "confusing tax history concerning the integrity
of the corporation" and its ability to act as its shareholder's agent); Rands, supra note 6, at
696 (noting that courts have taken an "ill-fitting approach," which confuses the question of
whether a corporation is a viable taxable entity with whether it is a valid agent); Riess, supra
note 3, at 101 (noting a "history of uncertainty").
31. See Greenberg v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 1030 (1989) (noting that the Supreme
Court in Bollinger reaffirmed the applicability of the National Carbide criteria, but in a less
rigid manner); Seto & Glimcher, supra note 16, at 384.
32. 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
33. Id. at 438-39.
34. Id. at 437.
35. Id. at 437-38.
36. Id. at 440.
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a corporation could act as an agent for its shareholder, the Court
refused to recognize an agency relationship based solely on the identity
37
of interests shared by a closely held corporation and its shareholder.
Focusing directly upon the question of when a corporation becomes a
separate taxable entity, the Court held that a corporation possesses
separate taxable status whenever it has a business purpose or conducts
business activity.By contrast, National Carbide involved the presence of agency
agreements between a large chemical manufacturer, Airco, and three
of its wholly owned subsidiaries The subsidiaries managed the production and marketing of various chemical products. 40 Pursuant to the
agreements, Airco lent the subsidiaries interest free working capital
and supplied certain management services, equipment, and office
facilities. 41 In return, the subsidiaries remitted to Airco all but six
percent of earned profits. Airco, rather than the subsidiaries, reported
these profits as taxable income.2
The Commissioner reallocated Airco's reported income to the subsidiaries and assessed deficiencies accordingly. 43 The subsidiaries
claimed they should not be taxed on the reallocated income because
they had received the income only in their capacity as agents for
Airco.4 They argued an agency relationship existed for tax purposes
partially because of the complete ownership and control of one corporation by another. 45 The Court had clearly rejected this position in
Moline Properties.46 In addition, the subsidiaries claimed agency status
because of written agency agreements, noting that as agents they
were excepted from the holding in Moline Propertiesthat a corporation
with business activity is taxable separately on the income it generates. 47 Thus, they argued the income earned was taxable not to the
48
subsidiaries, but solely to Airco.
While accepting the subsidiaries' interpretation of Moline Properties, the Court refused to accept the proposition that a parent corpo-

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id. at 438-39.
National Carbide, 336 U.S. at 424 n.1.
Id. at 424-25.
Id. at 425-26.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 426-27.
Id. at 429.
Moline Properties, 319 U.S. at 439-41.
National Carbide, 336 U.S. at 426.
Id. at 426-27.
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ration's complete ownership and control of a subsidiary creates the
kind of agency relationship referenced in Moline Properties.49 Further,
the Court did not find the existence of agency contracts controlling2 °
The Court viewed testimony regarding Airco's desire to operate
through separately incorporated subsidiaries to minimize liability for
its multistate operations as strong evidence of Aireo's lack of intent
to operate the subsidiaries as agents. 5' Such a result is directly contrary to that which a normal agency relationship would achieve.
In part, the Court found the arrangements between Airco and its
subsidiaries more indicative, in substance, of a typical parent-subsidiary relationship than of an agency relationship.52 Nonetheless, the
Court did not cite the substance-over-form or sham transaction doctrine as a basis for its holding.-' Instead, the Court rested its decision
on the failure of the arrangement to satisfy the newly formulated test
for tax recognition of a controlled corporate agent. As applied by
the National Carbide Court, that test required the consideration of
the following six factors:
(1) Whether the corporation operates in the name of the
principal and on its behalf;
(2) Whether the agent corporation binds the principal by its
actions;
(3) Whether the agent corporation transmits money received
for the account of the principal to the principal;
(4) Whether receipt of income is attributable to the services
and assets of the principal and not the agent;
49. Id. at 439.
50. Id. at 435-36.
51. Id. at 438 n.21.
52. Id. at 438.
53. Id. at 438-39. Having found that the subsidiaries remitted profits to the parent corporation because of the control exercised by the parent as controlling shareholder, and not as
principal, the Court could have rested its holding on a substance-over-form analysis. Such an
analysis would have looked at the transaction as a whole to determine its economic substance,
without attempting to isolate one circumstance from another, as apparently the NationalCarbide
Court did when it articulated its six-factors test. Id. at 437-38. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Court
Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945). The following is a concise statement of the substance-overform or sham transaction doctrine: "To treat a transaction as a sham, the court must find that
the taxpayer was motivated by no business purposes other than obtaining tax benefits in entering
the transaction, and that the transaction has no economic substance because no reasonable

possibility of a profit exists . . . [or because the arrangement is not compelled by business or
regulatory realities as determined from the facts and circumstances]." Rice's Toyota World, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d 89, 91 (4th Cir. 1985); also see Frank Lyon Co. v. United States,
435 U.S. 561 (1978); Cliff & Levine, Reflections on Ownership- Sales and Pledgesof Installment
Obligations, 39 TAx LAw. 37 (1985).
54. National Carbide, 336 U.S. at 438-39.
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(5) Whether the agent corporation's relations with its principal are dependent upon the latter's ownership of the principal; and
(6) Whether its business purpose is the carrying on of the
normal duties of an agent. 5
Applying the factors set forth above, the Court concluded that the
subsidiaries were not "true agents" of Airco. 5 6 Unable to find that the
profits were taxable only to Airco as principal in a bona fide agency
relationship, the rule in Moline Propertiescompelled the Court to find
the subsidiaries taxable on the profits. 57 In so finding, the Court distinguished the question of whether an arrangement constitutes a valid
agency relationship from the question of whether an entity is a viable
taxpayer.
B.

Off on the Wrong Track - Criticism of the Court's Holding
in National Carbide

The National Carbide Court failed to explain its purpose in articulating a new six-factors test for controlled corporate agents rather
than relying upon traditional tax law doctrines.6 Commentators have
suggested that the Court intended to establish a federal common law
of agency 9 More narrowly viewed, the Court may have intended
merely to list considerations particularly relevant to the case at hand
without requiring their application in all cases involving controlled
60
corporate agents.

55. Id. at 437.
56. Id. at 438-39.
57. Id.
58. The court prefaced its six-factors holding by stating its intent not to "foreclose a true
corporate agent or trustee from handling the property and income of its owner-principal without
being taxable therefor." Id. at 437. The Court also referred to, at least some of the six factors,
as "relevant considerations." Id. at 437. Thus, its intent to leave the door open to recognition,
for tax purposes, of a controlled corporate agent was stated clearly. What remains unclear,
even after Bollinger, is whether a "true corporate agent" can be measured only by the presence
of certain select criteria or whether the totality of the circumstances was the intended measure.
See infra note 60.
59. Seto & Glimcher, supra note 18, at 385.
60. Given the National Carbide holding, as set forth below, it is arguable that all requirements but those of an agency relationship independent of common control and an agency business
purpose were intended as merely relevant considerations. That holding, in pertinent part, is as
follows:
Whether the corporations operates in the name . . . of the principal, binds the
principal . . . are some of the relevant considerations in determining whether a
true agency exists. If the corporation is a true agent, its relations with its principal
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For example, the first two National Carbide factors address
whether an alleged corporate agent holds itself out to third parties
as acting on behalf of its principal. Conceivably, the Court directed
these factors at evidence that the alleged principal in NationalCarbide
desired to insulate itself from liability for its alleged corporate agents'
(or subsidiaries') activities; this objective indicated a lack of intent to
form an agency relationship.61 The sixth National Carbide factor,
which addresses whether an alleged agent's business activities constitute the usual duties of an agent, provides another example. Here,
the concern likely was the breadth of the alleged corporate agents'
business activities.6 Arguably, these examples suggest that the
Court's focus in establishing the now famous National Carbide factors
was primarily upon the case at hand. Such a list of factors, fine-tuned
primarily for the facts at hand, lacks the generality necessary for a
rule of law suitable for subsequent application.
In comparison, traditional tax law doctrines such as substance over
form and assignment of income could have supported the National

Carbide holding with precedential weight.6 Unfortunately, the Court
cited neither traditional tax law doctrine nor statutory grounds in
support of its decision.64 Without a statutory basis or general doctrine

must not be dependent upon the fact that it is owned by the principal, if such is
the case. Its business purpose must be the carrying on of the normal duties of an
agent.
National Carbide,336 U.S. at 437 (emphasis added). In addition, if the Court in Bollinger, as
its language suggests, intended to reduce the National Carbide requirement of an independent
agency relationship to "a generalized statement of the concern . . . that the separate-entity
doctrine of Moline not be subverted," then the National Carbide six-factors checklist has been
reduced indeed to a mere list of relevant considerations. Bollinger, 108 S. Ct. 1179.
61. National Carbide, 336 U.S. at 438 n.21.
62. Id. at 424 n.1.
63. See supra note 53. It is puzzling that the National Carbide Court referenced assignment
of income and sham transaction concerns in footnotes without focusing upon either doctrine in
the body of its decision. See 336 U.S. at 437 n.19 (Court discussed the applicability of the
assignment-of-income doctrine to income produced as the result of assets owned and labor
supplied by the subsidiaries); id. at 437 n.20 (Court considered the possible application of the
sham transaction doctrine regardless of whether criteria of agency are satisfied). Furthermore,
these traditional tax law doctrines were "alive and kicking" at the time of the decision in
National Carbide.See, e.g., Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930) (anticipatory assignment of
income doctrine applied to family income-shifting arrangement); Commissioner v. Court Holding
Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945) (substance-over-form analysis applied to post-liquidation sale of assets
by a shareholder imputed to the corporation because it negotiated the terms of the sale).
64. Arguably, determinations of whether transactions are sales or leases, agency arrangements or corporate-shareholder relationships, or effective transfers of property interests versus
mere anticipatory assignments of income are all determinations requiring an analysis of the
economic substance of the transaction. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 291
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to support the six factors, lower courts have applied them exclusively,
and at times rigidly, as if they were a statutory mandate.6
III.

CASES SUBSEQUENT TO NATIONAL CARBIDE:
VARYING ANALYSES

The lower courts utilized two differing applications of the National
Carbide criteria. The Tax Court refused to apply the test rigidly,
focusing instead upon the genuineness of the business purpose for the
chosen structure. 66 Alternately, the Fourth and Fifth Circuit Courts
of Appeal routinely decided against taxpayers using a controlled corporate agent solely because of the presence of common control.67 The
Sixth Circuit in Bollinger declined to follow the Fourth and Fifth
Circuits and necessitated the Supreme Court's decision of that case
in early 1988.6
A.

Tax Court Decisions -

Pre-Bollinger

When discussing Tax Court decisions in the National Carbide line
of cases, one must remember that the Fourth and Fifth Circuits generally reversed the Tax Court in pre-Bollinger cases they reviewed.69
Nonetheless, the Tax Court decisions reflect an analysis more suggestive of the substance-over-form concerns and less suggestive of
mechanical application of National Carbide's six factors. Further, the
Supreme Court's Bollinger decision suggests that appellate courts will
follow the Tax Court's approach in the future.
In Roccaforte v. Commissioner,70 the Tax Court faced a fact pattern
typical of those cases following National Carbide.There, the taxpayers

(1946) (Court found a lack of any real economic change with respect to the person earning the
income after considering all the facts and circumstances in applying assignment-of-income doctrine); Roccaforte v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 263 (1981), rev'd, 708 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1983)
(Court concluded the "entire substance" of the arrangement was one of an agency relationship).
See Cliff & Levine, supra note 53, at 37-42 (noting that determining whether there has been a
shift in ownership of property is a factual determination without any one circumstance controlling). Thus, the question arises why the determination of a valid agency relationship has been
hamstrung, first, by the National Carbide's six-factors checklist, and now, perhaps, by Bollinger's three-factors checklist. See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
65. See infra notes 98-114 and accompanying text.
66. See Rands, supra note 6, at 700-03; infra text accompanying notes 70-96.
67. See Recent Developments, supra note 18, at 381-82; infra text accompanying notes
98-114.
68. Bollinger, 108 S. Ct. 1173 (1988), affg, 807 F.2d 65 (6th Cir. 1986).
69. See George v. Commissioner, 803 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1986), vacated, 108 S. Ct. 1264
(1988); Frink v. Commissioner, 798 F.2d 106 (4th Cir. 1986), vacated, 108 S. Ct. 1264 (1988);
text accompanying notes 98-114.
70. 77 T.C. 263 (1981), rev'd, 708 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1983).
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formed a partnership for real estate development purposes and sought
financing for construction and operation of an apartment complex from
private investors and various lending institutions. 71 Permanent financing became available contingent upon the use of a corporate rather
than a partnership entity for borrowing purposes.7 The lending institution was unwilling to loan the amount of money requested to a partnership borTower because state usury laws limited the amount of interest
lenders could charge to noncorporate borrowers.3 Thus, the taxpayers
formed a corporation solely to hold title to the real estate, execute
the loan documents, and receive the loan proceeds as agent for the
partnership. 74
Various indicia of an agency relationship documented the parties'
intent. The partners and co-owners of the real estate had executed a
nominee agreement with the corporation. This agreement provided
that the corporation held title to the real estate solely as a nominee
with no authority to act with respect to the property without written
authorization of the partners, the true beneficial owners of the property. 7F Later, the partnership and the corporation entered into an
agency agreement that reaffirmed the nominee agreement, restated
the purpose of forming the corporation, and provided that the partners
would indemnify and hold harmless the corporation as agent for its
activities in connections with the apartment complex.76 In addition,
the parties consistently revealed the corporation's agency status to
third parties.7
Although the corporation filed a corporate tax return, it reported
no income, losses, assets, or liabilities; instead these items were reported on the partnership tax return. The taxpayers reported their
distributive share of the partnership loss attributable to the real estate
development activities on their personal income tax returns. 78 The
Commissioner disallowed the partnership losses reported by the taxpayers for tax years 1975 and 1976, claiming that the losses were
attributable to the corporation's rather than the partnership's activities. 79 The taxpayers conceded that the corporation was a viable

71.
72.
73.
74.

Roccaforte, 77 T.C. at 267.
Id. at 269.
Id. at 270.
Id. at 265-68.

75.
76.

Id. at 268.
Id. at 270.

77.
78.
79.

Id. at 269.
Id. at 277.
Id. at 277-78.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1989

13

REVIEW
FLORIDA
Florida
LawLAW
Review,
Vol. 41, Iss. 4 [1989], Art. 5

[Vol. 41

taxable entity requiring recognition. Nonetheless, they sought to attribute the income and losses from the real estate development activities
to the partnership, claiming that the corporation held title to the
4
assets and acted merely in the capacity of agent for the partnership.
The Tax Court distinguished the existence of a viable taxable entity, as discussed in Moline Properties, from the National Carbide
issue of valid agency relationship. It found the alleged corporate agent
to satisfy the criteria for taxable entity status. The Tax Court concluded, however, that such a finding did not preclude the existence
of a valid agency relationship."' In determining the substance of the
arrangement, the Tax Court found an agency relationship in substance
8
even though not all six National Carbide criteria were met. 2
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Tax Court's Roccaforte decision on appeal."' Undaunted, the Tax Court subsequently
applied the National Carbide elements in a similar fashion in Ourisman v. Commissioner,4 a case appealable to the Fourth Circuit.8 5
Noting its careful consideration of the same issue in Roccaforte, the
Tax Court characterized the National Carbide criteria as "indicia of
agency"8 and not a 'factor checklist' to be mechanically applied to
7 More importantly, the Court again
...
the facts of each case ....
refused to require the fifth National Carbide element 4 as an absolute
prerequisite to finding a valid agency relationship in the controlled
corporate agent context. s9 Finding for the taxpayers, the Tax Court
summarized its interpretation of the National Carbide factors as follows:
The one crucial question under National Carbide concerns
the essential nature of the relationship between the purThe Suported corporate agent and its shareholders ....
preme Court expressly recognized that a corporation could
act as an agent for its owners under certain circumstances

80. Id. at 278.
81. Id. at 278-79.
82. Id. at 287-88.
83. 708 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1985), reh'g denied, 715 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1983).
84. 82 T.C. 171 (1984), vacated, 760 F.2d 541 (4th Cir. 1985).
85. Ourisman, 82 T.C. at 185. The Court noted it was not required to follow the Fifth
Circuit when venue for appeal was to the Fourth Circuit and restated its position that the
National Carbide criteria were merely relevant considerations in determining the true substance
of the arrangement. Id.
86. Id. at 181.
87. Id. at 185.
88. See supra text accompanying note 55.
89. Ourisman, 82 T.C. at 185.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol41/iss4/5

14

REVIEWAOF
NATIONAL
OF CASES
863
Newsome:
Reivew
of theCARBIDE
NationalLINE
Carbide
Line of Cases After Commissioner

. . . . In other words, the taxpayer must prove that the
agency existed independently of the shareholders' ownership
and control. In the present case, the petitioners have sustained such burden.9
As in Roccaforte, the Tax Court in Ourisman focused upon the
economic substance of the arrangement and the presence of a business
purpose to negate any inference of a scheme for avoiding taxes.
In addition, the Tax Court in Ourisman dismissed the concern that
recognition of a corporate agent for tax purposes will allow taxpayers
to disregard any closely held corporation solely for tax purposes under
a guise of agency. 91 The Court stated, "[t]he rule of Moline Properties,
that the corporate entity will generally be respected for tax purposes,
is unshaken by our decisions"; a corporation may act as an agent of
its owners and still be a separate taxable entity. 92 The Court also
noted that most taxpayers form closely held corporations for limited
liability purposes and that a corporate agent arrangement could defeat
this objective. 3 Thus, in the Tax Court's view, shareholders are unlikely to seek an agency arrangement solely for tax avoidance purposes.
In summary, the Tax Court's pre-Bollinger decisions discussed
above - Roccaforte and Ourisman- illustrate three essential points:
(1) A corporation can be an agent for its shareholders or for an
entity controlled by its shareholders without violating the rule in
Moline Properties;
(2) The Tax Court will characterize a corporation as an agent in
substance when the arrangement reflects sufficient indicia of a traditional agency relationship without facts suggesting a tax avoidance
motive; and
(3) In determining whether an agency relationship exists, in substance, the Tax Court will not apply the National Carbide factors in"
a mechanical or rigid fashion.
Nonetheless, the Tax Court did not address the proper allocation of
income between the principal and the corporate agent. 94 Relevant to

90. Id. at 185-86.
91. Id. at 187.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Although the Tax Court in its Roccaforte decision noted the lack of arm's-length terms,
including an agency fee, between the principal partnership and the corporate agent, it considered
this circumstance to be relevant to the National Carbide requirement of an agency relationship
independent of common control. Roccaforte, 77 T.C. at 287. The Tax Court did not consider,
in either its Roccaforte or its Ourismanr decisions, whether the lack of an agency fee provided
an opportunity for the manipulation or distortion of taxable income.
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this issue is the presence of arm's-length charges between the parties
for the use of property and for services and goods provided. 95 Though
not of primary concern to the Tax Court, an arm's-length fee arrangement was crucial to the Fourth Circuit's application of the National
Carbide factors prior to Bollinger as discussed below.9
B.

The Circuit Courts of Appeal Cases -

Pre-Bollinger

The most significant difference between the Tax Court cases discussed above and the decisions of the Fourth, Fifth, and Federal
Circuits,9 has been the weight given the fifth National Carbidefactor.
This factor provides that "[i]f the corporation is a true agent, its
relations with its principal must not be dependent upon the fact that
it is owned by the principal, if such is the case."98 Courts have often
interpreted the fifth factor as questioning whether common control
exists. These courts find common control when the principal owns the
corporate agent or the same party (or parties) owns both the principal
and the corporate agent.Y
Because the National Carbide Court provided little guidance as
to its purpose in articulating the six-factors agency test or to the
weight to be given each factor, lower courts have been at liberty to
apply the National Carbide decision in a substance over-form spirit
or strictly as a statutory mandate. 1°° As noted above, the Tax Court
The proper allocation of income between related or commonly controlled parties is the focus
of I.R.C. § 482 (1986). Section 482, in pertinent part, is set forth supra note 29.
95. See supranote 94. Arm's-length terms, including fee arrangements for services provided,
are required by I.R.C. § 482 to accomplish its purpose of determining the "true taxable income
of each (commonly] controlled taxpayer." Treas. Reg. § 1.482 1(b)(1) (as amended in 1968).
96. See infra notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
97. Vaughn v. United States, 740 F.2d 941, 945 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
98. National Carbide, 336 U.S. at 437.
99. See Moncrief v. United States, 730 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1984); see also supra note 4.
100. See supranote 53. Courts that use the National Carbide six factors merely as relevant
considerations effectively are applying a substance-over-form or sham transaction analysis because such an analysis looks to the totality of the circumstances in determining the economic
substance of the transaction(s). See, e.g., National Investors Corp. v. Hoey, 144 F.2d 466, 467
(2d Cir. 1944) (stating that the Commissioner can look at the "actualities and upon determination
that the form employed of doing business ... is unreal or a sham may sustain or disregard
the effect of the fiction as best serves the purposes of the tax statute .... "). Application of

the National Carbide factors merely as relevant considerations seems even more appropriate
after the Supreme Court's Bollinger decision. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
However, even those courts which claimed to apply the Carbide factors merely as relevant
factors did not consider any other circumstances supporting or refuting a valid agency relationship. See, e.g., Roccaforte, 77 T.C. at 287, rev'd, 708 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1983); Bollinger, 807
F.2d at 69-70 (6th Cir. 1986), affd, 485 U.S. 340 (1988). Perhaps a more expanded vision of
relevant circumstances would have forced a clearer articulation of a substance-over-form approach
and a corresponding deemphasis on the National Carbide six factors. See supra note 64.
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took the former route, while the Fourth, Fifth, and Federal Circuits
took the latter approach. 10 1
For example, in the Fifth Circuit's Roccaforte decision, the court
explicitly rejected the Tax Court's position that each of the National
Carbide factors should be given equal weight to determine the "entire
substance" of the transaction. 1 2 Instead, the court found the fifth
factor, requiring an agency relationship independent of common control, and the sixth factor, requiring that the corporation's business
purpose be that of an agent's, to be prerequisites to a finding of true
agency. 103 Thus, the presence of common ownership in Roccaforte precluded a finding of agency despite the presence of substantial indicia
of an agency relationship and purpose. 1°0
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit in Ourisman refused to find a true
agency relationship in a controlled corporate agent context, also requiring satisfaction of the fifth and sixth National Carbide factors.105 More
importantly, the Fourth Circuit found that the presence of an arm'slength arrangement between the alleged principal and controlled corporate agent determined whether the relationship satisfied the fifth
National Carbide factor.l°6 The court stated that although it could not
define precisely what was required in an arm's-length arrangement,
it considered the following circumstances relevant:
(1) Identity of ownership interests in the principal and agent;
(2) Limitations upon the ability of the corporation to act other than
as agent for third parties;
(3) Activities as an agent on behalf of more than one principal;
(4) Presence of a written agency agreement between the parties;
and
10 7
(5) Collection by the agent of a reasonable fee for its services.
Applying the National Carbide factors and, as set forth above, its
own list of additional considerations, the Fourth Circuit concluded that
the Tax Court erred as a matter of law in determining that the corporation in Ourismanwas a true nontaxable agent.10 8 The court focused
upon the lack of arm's-length terms between the principal partnership
and the corporate agent in concluding that the arrangement failed to

101. The Tax Court cases are discussed at supra notes 69-96 and accompanying text. The
Fourth and Fifth Circuit decisions are discussed at infra notes 102-14 and accompanying text.
102. Roccaforte, 708 F.2d at 989.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 989-90.
105. Ourisman, 760 F.2d at 549.

106. Id. at 548.
107.
108.

Id. at 547-48.
Id. at 548.
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satisfy the fifth National Carbide factor.109 Prior to Ourisman, courts

seemingly considered the percentage of common ownership to be the
litmus test for satisfaction of the fifth factor." 0
In most Fourth and Fifth Circuit cases, common control was the

stumbling block to finding an agency relationship for tax purposes.,,
Noteworthy, however, was the Fourth Circuit's attempt in Ourisman
to interpret the fifth National Carbidefactor as requiring the presence

of arm's-length terms. Although other courts have referred to the
need for an arm's-length flavoring, 1 2 it appears that only the Ourisman
court has attempted to flesh out the meaning of arm's length in the
controlled corporate agent context." 3 Regardless, the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Commissionerv. Bollinger discourages a focus upon

the presence of arm's-length terms in determining the validity of an
alleged agency relationship.14
IV.' THE BOLLINGER DECISION AND SUBSEQUENT CASES
The facts in Bollinger typified the cases that followed National
Carbide. The taxpayers formed a partnership for the purpose of developing real estate and then formed a corporate agent to obtain
financing." 5 Virtually the same parties owned the partnership as
owned the corporate agent, and the usual indicia of agency were present. 116 In National Carbide,by contrast, the taxpayers had no business
reason for using the subsidiaries as agents.17 In fact, evidence indi-

109. Id.
110. Compare Raphan v. United States, 3 C1. Ct. 457, 462 (1983), affd in part, rev'd in
part, 759 F.2d 879 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 843 (1985) (finding not more than
50% control and a lack of close alignment of interest between the principal and corporate agent
to satisfy fifth National Carbidefactor of agency relationship independent of common ownership)
with Ourisman, 760 F.2d at 547-48 (examining various factors in determining whether the
purported agency relationship existed independent of common control) and Frink v. Commissioner, 798 F.2d 106 (4th Cir. 1986), vacated, 108 S. Ct. 1254 (1988) (also finding more than
50% ownership interest as precluding agency relationship independent of common control).
111. See, e.g., Frink v. Commissioner, 798 F.2d 106, 108-09 (4th Cir. 1986); Roccaforte v.
Commissioner, 708 F.2d 986, 987-89 (5th Cir. 1983). The Federal Circuit in Raphan v. United
States, 759 F.2d 879 (Fed. Cir. 1985), upheld an agency relationship with a corporate agent
based on the presence of the required indicia of common law agency, but in a structure lacking
common control.
112. See, e.g., Roccaforte v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 263, 287 (1981), rev'd, 708 F:2d 986
(5th Cir. 1983), reh'g denied, 715 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1983). See supra note 83.
113. See Ourisman, 760 F.2d at 547-48.
114. Bollinger, 108 S. Ct. 1173 (1988).
115. Id. at 1175.
116. Id. at 1175-76.
117. National Carbide, 336 U.S. at 438.
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cated that the taxpayers formed the subsidiaries to insulate the parent

corporation from liability, a business reason suggesting a relationship
opposite that of principal-agent."Is
Despite these factual differences, the analytical approaches taken
by the Supreme Court in both these cases is similar in many respects.
First, the Court in Bollinger expressed concern that an agency agreement might be a guise for an anticipatory assignment of income, 11
stating that income generated by property should be taxable to its
owner.2 ° The National Carbide Court had expressed a similar con-

cern. 12' Although the Court in each case was inclined to disregard
sham transactions and anticpatory assignments of income, neither
the Bollinger Court nor the National Carbide Court based its holding
on these concepts.-22 Instead, each Court focused on the presence of
select circumstances indicating an agency relationship under state common law without explaining whether other state law agency factors

might also support a valid agency relationship.m
A.

The Court's Analysis in Bollinger

The Court's analysis in Bollinger began, as have so many others
in the National Carbide line of cases, with an application of the rule
in Moline Properties.- However, the Court may have blurred the
distinction between the question of taxable entity status and that of

valid agency by stating as follows:
Obviously, Moline's separate-entity principle would be significantly compromised if shareholders of closely held corpora-

118. Id. at 438 n.21.
119. Bollinger, 108 S. Ct. at 1176. In effect, the Court implied an assignment-of-income
issue in stating the problem as the determination of who owns the property, citing Helvering
v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940) and Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948). Id.
120. Id.
121. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
122. Bollinger, 108 S. Ct. at 1177-78. See supra notes 63 65 and accompanying text.
123. Bollinger, 108 S. Ct. at 1179; National Carbide, 336 U.S. at 437.
For example, the law of agency recognizes an undisclosed principal. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 4 (1958). Yet a valid agency relationship in the context of common control
would not be recognized in the case of an undisclosed principal for federal income tax purposes
if the National Carbide factors, supplemented by the Bollingerfactors, are an exclusive listing
of circumstances relevant to such a determination. Both National Carbide and Bollinger listed
the disclosure of the agency relationship to third parties as a factor to be considered. Bollinger,
108 S. Ct. at 1179; National Carbide, 336 U.S. at 437.
124. Bollinger, 108 S. Ct. at 1177. That rule requires the recognition of a corporate entity
as a taxable entity if the corporation has a business purpose or carries on business activities.
Moline Properties, 319 U.S. at 438-39.
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tions could, by clothing the corporation with some attributes
of agency with respect to particular assets, leave themselves
free at the end of the tax year to make a claim - perhaps
even a good faith claim - of either agent or owner status,
depending
1 upon which choice turns out to minimize their tax

liability.

25

This excerpt suggests the Court failed to recognize that a corporation
likely will be a separate taxable entity under Moline Propertieseven
though it qualifies as a valid agent with regard to assets it holds or
goods and services it provides.2 6 The level of activity necessary to
meet the separate taxable entity status test of Moline Properties is
fairly minimal. 1' A court can test the issue of valid agency, however,
under National Carbide'ssix-factors approach, 12 Bollinger's three-factors approach, 12 or, consistent with the position taken in this article,
by a substance-over-form analysis which considers without constraint
the overall facts and circumstances. 30
In addition, the Court's concern that principals, such as shareholders or partnerships in common control structures, will freely regard
or disregard an agency relationship solely for tax purposes fails to
recognize other limitations on such a scheme. As the Tax Court acknowledged in Roccaforte and Ourisman, such unfettered use of an
agency-relationship label will defeat the primary reason for forming
corporations - to achieve limited liability for the shareholders. 131 Thus,
the Bollinger Court's failure to recognize the business disadvantage
of using a corporate agent and the ease with which an arrangement
can satisfy the separate taxable entity status under Moline Properties
arguably caused it to accept unnecessarily the Commissioner's claim
that taxpayers would use controlled corporate agents solely to escape

taxation. 132
125. Bollinger, 198 S. Ct. at 1177.
126. Other courts have committed the same error, concluding that recognition of a corporate
agent will defeat the rule in Moline Properties. See, e.g., Roccaforte, 708 F.2d at 990. In
comparison, the Tax Court in Ourismarn distinguished the recognition of a corporation as a

taxpaying entity from the recognition of a corporation as a valid agent. Ourisman, 82 T.C. at
171. See Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 131 (1947); see also Miller, supra note 3, at
252-60 (examining evolution of cases which involve dummy corporation); supratext accompanying

notes 55-58.
127. Moline Properties, 319 U.S. at 438-39. See B. BiTTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note
2.07(1).
128. See Ourisman, 82 T.C. at 187; B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 27, 2.10.
129. See George v. Commissioner, 844 F.2d 225, 228-29 (5th Cir. 1988).
130. See supratext accompanying note 53 and infratext accompanying notes 165-69, 189-90.
131. See Roccaforte, 77 T.C. at 287; Ourisman, 82 T.C. at 187.
132. An agency relationship creates special fiduciary duties and entails obligations not present in other arrangements. An agent, acting within the scope of his authority, can obligate the
27,
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However, the Bollinger Court did resist the Commissioner's advocacy of a "prophylactically clear test of agency" in a controlled corporate agent situation. 13 The Commissioner argued for this test, a position taken by the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, which virtually bars the
recognition of an agency relationship in a common control context.34
Such a bar was unacceptable to the Court because it intended, consistent with National Carbide, to leave open the possibility of a true
agency relationship despite the existence of common control.135 To
assure the "genuineness" of the agency relationship and to prevent
manipulation of income, the Court required the presence of the following three factors:
(1) Written agency agreement at the time assets are acquired
by the corporate agent;
(2) Activities by both the principal and the agent consistent
with the agreement; and
(3) Representation of the agency arrangement to all third
parties dealing with the asset.1 36
Unfortunately, the Court in Bollinger refrained, as it did in National
Carbide, from suggesting the weight to accord these factors or whether
other circumstances might provide the same assurance of "genuineness."
Lastly, in a surprising twist, the Court abandoned inquiry into the
presence of arm's-length terms, noting that "neither ... [an agency
fee nor arm's-length terms] is demanded by the [state common] law
of agency . ... "137 This language is troubling given that section 482

principal contractually, even for liabilities resulting from the agent's torts. H. REUSCHLEIN &
GREGORY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP, ch. 1, § 3 (1979).
This exposure to liability defeats one of the purposes of operating in the corporate form, and
thus, diminishes the likelihood that shareholders will attempt use of a corporate agent arrange-

W.

ment solely, for example, to benefit from the resulting attribution of corporate losses. See supra
note 93 and accompanying text. For the Supreme Court's recognition of the "flow-through"
effect of a corporate agent structure, see Bollinger, 108 S. Ct. at 1177.
133. Bollinger, 108 S. Ct. at 1177-79.
134. Id. at 1178-79.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1179. The court stated as follows:
We see no basis . . . for holding that unequivocal evidence [of a valid agency
relationship] can only consist of the rigid requirements [of] (arm's-length dealing
plus agency fee) that the Commissioner suggests. Neither of those is demanded
by the law of agency, which permits agents to be unpaid family members, friends,
or associates.
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of the Code generally requires the presence of arm's-length terms
between commonly controlled entities. 1H Because that section focuses
primarily upon a clear reflection of income, requiring arm's-length
have alleviated the Court's
terms sufficient to satisfy section 482 might
139
concerns regarding income manipulation.
In summary, the conflict between the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Circuits forced the Supreme Court in Bollinger to revisit an issue
that has proven slippery and abstract for commentators and courts
alike.1 40 The Court seemed concerned about the violation of assignment
of income and sham transaction doctrines; yet, the Court failed to rely
upon either doctrine in its holding. Instead, the Court articulated what
some have called a new federal common law test for agency' and
what others are characterizing as solely a clarification of the National
Carbide factors.'4 Moreover, questions remain regarding the application of this three-part test, such as whether its application is mandatory and how it relates to the National Carbide test. As with all
judge-made law, lower court interpretation of the decision may provide
answers to some of these questions. A brief look at some subsequent
lower court cases follows.
B.

Cases Subsequent to Bollinger

Two of the first cases to address the controlled corporate agent
issue after Bollinger are Frink v. Commissioner,13 decided by the
Fourth Circuit, and George v. Commissioner, 44 decided by the Fifth
Circuit. Both cases arose from factually similar situations and were
decided after the Supreme Court vacated judgments for the Commissioner and remanded the cases for further consideration in light of
the Bollinger decision. 4 5 The vacated judgments were based primarily

The Court's language, as set forth above, raises the question of whether other requirements
such as the requirements of a written agency agreement and representations of the agency
relationship to third parties, both seemingly mandatory factors under National Carbide and
Bollinger, also can be abandoned, as neither is required under the law of agency. See H.
REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP,

ch. 2, § 12 (1979).
138. See supra notes 29, 95.
139. See Commissioner v. First Security Bank, 405 U.S. 394, 408 (1972) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); Falk, supra note 3, at 729; infra notes 170-90 and accompanying text.
140. Bollinger, 108 S. Ct. at 1175-76. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
141. See, e.g., Seto & Glimcher, supra note 18, at 385.
142. See, e.g., Riess, supra note 3, at 105-06.
143. 846 F.2d 5 (4th Cir. 1988), vacated and remanded, 108 S. Ct. 1264 (1988).
144. 844 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1988).
145. Id. at 226; Frink, 846 F.2d at 6.
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upon a finding that common control and the lack of arm's-length146 terms
prevented satisfaction of the fifth National Carbide element.
The facts in these two cases typify other corporate agent cases
involving the formation of a partnership for development or operation
of real estate, followed by the formation of a corporation to obtain
financing in compliance with demands of the lending institutions. 147 In
addition, the arrangements satisfied all but the fifth of the National
Carbide factors. On remand, both the Fourth and Fifth Circuit found
for the taxpayers, concluding that the three-part Bollinger test had
been met.143
In its decision, the Fifth Circuit provided some insight into how
the National Carbide factors might interact with the Bollinger threepart test. The court cited both sets of factors in its decision, but
specifically disregarded National Carbide'sfifth factor once it determined that Bollingers three-part test was met, stating as follows:
Therefore, we hold that the agency test set forth in Bollinger
is met . . . . When agency is clear, there is no risk that
taxpayers could, at the end of the year, manipulate the corporation's status to minimize their tax liability . . . . Consequently, when it is clear that the parties intended that
the corporation act only as an agent, there is no need to
make a separate strict inquiry about the extent to which the
status is dependent on the principal's
agent corporation's
49
ownership.1
Thus, having decided that the arrangement satisfied Bollinger's requirements, the court apparently found it unnecessary to apply, point
by point, the six-part National Carbide test, especially with respect
to factor five. 15
Two later Tax Court memorandum decisions also cite both National
Carbide and Bollinger as the bases for their holdings. O'Neal v. Commissioners1 involved the formation of a corporation at the insistence
of a potential lender in light of state usury laws limiting interest
charged to noncorporate borrowers. 152 The taxpayers/shareholders
needed the funds to operate an automobile dealership that they previ-

146.
147.
148.
149.

See George, 844 F.2d at 228.
Id. at 226-27; Frink, 798 F.2d at 108-09.
Frink, 846 F.2d at 6; George, 844 F.2d at 229.
George, 844 F.2d at 229.

150. Id. at 228.
151. 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 1347 (1989).
152. Id.
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ously operated as sole proprietors. 1 3 The Commissioner disallowed
expenses deducted on the taxpayers' individual income tax returns,
assessed late filing penalties, and imposed negligence penalties.154 A
portion of the deficiencies resulted from $158,511 in constructive dividends caused by the taxpayers' use of corporate funds for personal
living expenses. 15
The taxpayers argued that the corporation was merely their agent.
Thus, the money deemed received from the corporation was taxable
to them not as constructive dividends, but as income attributable to
them as principals.'5 Correspondingly, they argued that the corporation's losses and expenses were also attributable to them as princi57
pals.1
Applying first the Bollinger criteria, the court noted that the taxpayers offered no written agency agreement, no evidence that the
taxpayers represented the agency relationship to third parties, nor
any evidence that the corporate agent otherwise functioned in a manner typical of an agent. The court then found that the taxpayers'
failure to meet Bollingers three-part test meant that evidence of a
true agency relationship independent of common control was lacking,
and thus, the arrangement failed to meet the fifth National Carbide
factor. 8 Somewhat surprisingly, the court further stated that "[s]ince
satisfaction of that factor is mandatory, . . .our conclusion makes it
unnecessary to explore the extent to which the other five factors
involved in determining whether a corporation is a true agent of its
159
owner principal have been satisfied."'
Similarly, in the Tax Court memorandum decision of Greenberg v.
60 the Court interpreted
Commissioner,1
Bollingers three-part test as
complementing the National Carbidecriteria by providing clearer content to National Carbide'sfifth factor.16 1 According to both the O'Neal

153. Id.
154. Id. at 1349.
155. Id. at 1348.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1348-49.
158. Id. at 1348.
159. Id. The statement is surprising in light of the Supreme Court's Bollinger decision,
wherein the Court clarified the fifth National Carbidefactor - requiring an agency relationship
independent of common control - as not a mandatory prerequisite after all; rather, the Court
characterized the fifth factor as a generalized concern that a corporation not evade taxation
under the rule in Moline Properties. Bollinger, 108 S. Ct. at 1179.
160. 56 T.C.M. (CCII) 1030 (1989).
161. Id. at 1032.
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court and the Greenberg court, Bollinger rejects the position that the
fifth factor only can be met by evidence of ar's-length dealing, including an agency fee, and instead merely requires evidence that the
162
agency relationship is genuine.
The thread tying these post-Bollingercases together is the deciding
courts' belief that Bollinger complements, rather than supplants, National Carbide by providing clearer content to National Carbide'sfifth
factor. Each of these courts viewed National Carbide's fifth factor,
in light of Bollinger, as requiring substantial evidence of the "genuineness" of the alleged agency relationship. Such an interpretation is
commendable in that it avoids the artificiality of maling the "genuineness" of the arrangement dependent upon the absence of common
control.'i Nonetheless, these decisions leave unanswered the question
of whether that "genuineness" can be supported by other factors considered indicative of an agency relationship under traditional agency
law concepts. Finally, to the extent that Bollingerrejects the requirement of arm's-length terms, it threatens to give taxpayers a false
sense of security. The Commissioner still has broad powers under
section 482 of the Code which can be applied to force arm's-length fee
arrangements between related parties.'6
V.

ALTERNATIVES TO THE NATIONAL CARBIDE LINE OF CASES

As outlined previously in this paper, fact patterns involving the
use of corporate agents conceivably give rise to three separate issues:
(1) Whether the alleged corporate agents are separate taxable entities or so closely aligned in interest with their shareholder(s) as to require a "merging" of their identity for tax
purposes;
(2) Whether income earned and losses incurred by the alleged
corporate agent are attributable to its principal pursuant to
a valid agency relationship; and

162. Id.; O'Neal, 56 T.C.M. at 1348.
163. See, e.g., George. 844 F.2d at 229 (stating that "when it is clear that the parties
intended that the corporation act only as an agent, there is no need to make a separate strict
inquiry about the extent to which the agent corporation's status is dependent on the principal's
ownership"). See also Rands, supra note 6, at 702 (advocating an analysis which determines
who is the substantive owner of property, title to which is held in nominee capacity, rather
than a National Carbide agency approach); Miller, supra note 3, at 258-60 (noting that the
National Carbide requirement of an agency relationship independent of common control can be
assured simply by transferring a percentage of ownership to an unrelated third party so as to
dilute the control factor).
164. See infra notes 170-209 and accompanying text.
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(3) Whether arm's-length charges for the use of assets, employees, loans, and services exist between the principal(s)
and the corporate agent. 16
Moline Properties squarely answers the first question. As long as a
corporation has a business purpose or carries on business activities,
it is a separate taxable entity.r Courts have historically analyzed the
second issue by applying the National Carbide factors, now refined
by Bollingers three factors test for "genuineness of the agency relationship.167 The third issue reflects section 482 concerns. Except for
its brief appearance in a National Carbide footnote, section 482 has
been noticeably absent from this line of cases. Armed with the fifth
National Carbidefactor, perhaps the Service has felt no need to swing
the section 482 hammer. Given, however, the Service's historic use
of section 482 to attack a "variety of tax abuses," 168 and given the
Supreme Court's rejection of a requirement for arm's-length terms in
Bollinger,169 the Service may soon find use for section 482 in controlled
corporate agent cases.
A.

Section 482

Current section 482 was first enacted as section 45 of the Revenue
Act of 1928.170 Its purpose was, and still is, "to prevent the avoidance
of tax liability through fictions and 'to deny the power to shift income
. . arbitrarily among qoritrolled corporations, and to place such cor' 71
porations rather on a parity with uncontrolled concerns.' 1
*

165. Regarding the first issue, see supra notes 32-38, 80-82 and accompanying text. The
second issue is discussed at length at supra notes 39-65, 116-42 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of the third issue, see infra notes 170-209 and accompanying text.
166. Moline Properties, 319 U.S. at 438-39.
167. Bollinger, 108 S. Ct. at 1178-79.
168. A Study of Intercompany Pricing, Discussion Draft 7 (Oct. 18, 1988) [hereinafter
Discussion Draft] (compiled by the Treasury Department, Office of International Tax Counsel,
Office of Tax Analysis, and the Internal Revenue Service, among others). See infra text accompanying notes 191-209.
169. Bollinger, 108 S. Ct. at 1179. See supra note 137.
170. Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 45, 45 Stat. 806.
171. Commissioner v. First Security Bank, 405 U.S. 394, 408 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting). The statute's purpose was set forth in the Senate Committee Report, as follows:
Section 45 is based upon section 240(f) of the 1926 act, broadened considerably in
order to afford adequate protection to the Government. The section of the new
bill provides that the commissioner may, in the case of two or more trades or
businesses owned or controlled by the same interests, apportion, allocate, or distribute the income or deductions between or among them, in such manner as may be
necessary in order to prevent evasion (by the shifting of profits, the making of
fictitious sales, and other methods frequently adopted for the purpose of "nilking"),
and in order to arrive at their true tax liability.,*
S. REP. No. 960, 70th Cong., 1st Sess.
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The statute authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to allocate
items of income, deductions, and credits among or between related
taxpayers. The Secretary may exercise this authority only as necessary
to clearly reflect income or prevent evasion of taxes.-i 2 Although section 482 is available to the Commissioner in tax fraud cases, its use
is not limited to situations of tax evasion or where avoidance motive
is present. 173
The Secretary can exercise authority to reallocate income or losses
to clearly reflect income and thereby determine an individual or entity's "true taxable income"'174 with respect to any "group of controlled
taxpayers."175 The Treasury Regulations define a "group of controlled
taxpayers" to mean organizations, trades, or businesses (including
individuals) owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the same
5 The regulations contain no threshold percentage of ownerinterestsY7
ship requirement for satisfying the term "controlled."1 77 The regulations do, however, create a presumption of control if the taxpayers
have arbitrarily shifted income or deductions. 17
The standard for determining the "true taxable income" of a controlled group member is, as it has been since 1935, "that of an uncontrolled taxpayer dealing at arm's length with another uncontrolled
taxpayer."' 179 Basically, this standard requires the identification of
charges between unrelated tax-payers in comparable transactions. 11
The problem with such a standard is its dependence upon finding a
comparable transaction without a common control context.
To provide taxpayers with further guidance as to the meaning of
the term "arm's length," the Service issued final regulations in 1968
governing the following five transactional categories:
(1) Loans or advances;'8 '
(2) Services;'82

172.
1968).
173.
174.
175.
in 1968).
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
at 12.
181.
182.

See Discussion Draft, supra note 168, at 6-8; Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c) (as amended in
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c) (as amended in 1968).
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(a) (as amended in 1968).
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c) (as amended in 1968); Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(a) (as amended
Treas.
Id.
Treas.
Treas.
Treas.

Reg. § 1.482-1(a) (as amended in 1968).
Reg. § 1.482-1(a)(3) (as amended in 1968).
Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1) (as amended in 1968); Treas. Reg. 86, § 45-1(b) (1935).
Reg. § 1.482-1(d)(3) (as amended in 1968); Discussion Draft, supra note 168,

Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(a) (as amended in 1988).
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(b) (as amended in 1988).
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(3) Use of tangible property, including leases; 183
(4) Transfer or use of intangible property; 184 and
(5) Sales of tangible property. '1 5
The regulations governing these transactional areas still generally look
to charges for similar transactions between unrelated taxpayers in
defining the arm's-length standard.1 6 In certain circumstances, however, the regulations provide exceptions to the arm's-length requirement or safe harbor arm's-length charges. For example, the regulations grant an exception to the arm's-length charge requirement for
services performed by one member of a controlled group for the benefit
of another member unless the services represent an integral part of
the business activity of either the service provider or the recipient. 157
This exception allows a cost-sharing arrangement to exist with respect
to, for example, shared managerial or marketing services. The exception would not apply, however, if either the service provider or the
recipient were in the business of providing marketing services.188
In summary, section 482 appears broad enough to apply to controlled corporate agent cases to prevent an artificial shifting of income
or loss from the corporate agent to the principal. The Commissioner
advocated its application in National Carbide with respect to the lack
of interest charges on monies that the parent corporation advanced
to the subsidiaries and with respect to the lack of rental charges for
the use of assets.8 9 A possible de minimis exception aside, 190 there

183. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(c) (as amended in 1988).
184. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(d) (as amended in 1988).
185. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(e) (as amended in 1988).
186. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(b)(3) (as amended in 1988). See also Treas. Reg. §
1.482-1(d)(3) (as amended in 1968) (providing 'the term arm's-length refers to the amount which
was charged or would have been charged in independent transactions with unrelated parties
under the same or similar circumstances considering all the relevant facts.").
187. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(b)(3) (as amended in 1988).
188. Id. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(b)(7)(ii)(a) for a description of "integral services."
189. National Carbide, 336 U.S. at 433-34 n.13.
190. A possible de minimis exception was suggested in an article in which the Commissioner

expressed his view that insignificant deviations from arm's-length charges would not result in
reallocations under I.R.C. § 482. Cohen, How the IRS Intends to Administer the New Regulations
Under Section 482, 28 J. TAX'N 73, 74 (Feb. 1968).
During the January 13, 1988 oral argument in the Bollinger case, Justice O'Connor, in
response to the Assistant to the Solicitor General's argument for an arm's-length agency fee,
asked whether the fee might be rather minimal. The Solicitor General's assistant argued a fee

was required nonetheless because the corporation did more than hold bare legal title, it exposed
itself to liability. Sheppard, Supreme Court Considers Whether CorporationsShould be Treated
as Separate Taxpayers, 38 TAx NOTES 215, 216 (1988).
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appears to be no reason why it would not also apply to services performed by a corporate agent in financing, brokering, or managing
property, or any other service typically performed by an agent.
B.

Section 482 in Conjunction with Judicial Doctrines
As early as 1935, the Service began using section 482 along with
sham transaction and assignment of income doctrines to prevent tax
evasion and to clearly reflect income. For example, in the 1935 case
of Asiatic Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner,19 the Second Circuit upheld the Commissioner's use of section 482 (then section 45)192 to reallocate approximately three million dollars in profits to a domestic
holding company from its foreign subsidiary. 193 The holding company
"sold" stock at cost to one of its foreign subsidiaries.,- The same day,
the foreign subsidiary sold the stock to an unrelated entity, realizing
almost three million dollars in profits. 195 The domestic holding company
did not report the profits on the consolidated return it filed with the
related subsidiaries.'9
In response to the taxpayer's claim that the statute was an unconstitutional taking of property without due process, the court stated:
[The section] does not measure the tax of one person by the
income of another; . . . rather, it looks through form to
reality, and recognizes that the appreciation in value during
the transferor's ownership of the property (when realized
for the benefit of the real owners . . .) should be ascribed
to the transferor rather than the transferee .... If anticipatory arrangements intended to circumvent taxes may be disregarded by the courts without the aid of statutory authority,
a statute authorizing the Commissioner to disregard them
97
under similar circumstances cannot be unconstitutional.1
Thus, the Second Circuit justified the application of section 482 by
comparing it to the traditionally accepted doctrines of assignment of
income and substance over form.198
191. 79 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 645 (1935), reh'g denied, 296 U.S.
664 (1935).
192. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
193. Asiatic Petroleum, 79 F.2d at 235.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Asiatic Petroleum, 79 F.2d at 235.
197. Id. at 238. The court recognized section 482 (then section 45) as a remedy available

to the Commissioner when confronted with sham transactions. Id.
198. The Third Circuit reached a similar result, preventing the shifting of losses from a
corporation unable to use them to a related corporation able to use the losses, in the 1943 case
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In Foglesongv. Commissioner (Foglesong1),199 the Seventh Circuit
examined the interrelation of section 482 and the assignment-of-income
doctrine. The Commissioner there argued that the court should disregard the personal service corporation formed by the taxpayer and tax
the corporation's income directly to the taxpayers. 2°° The taxpayers,
a sales representative and his wife, were the only shareholders in the
corporation which was formed to provide the taxpayer with limited
liability, contract with customers, and provide a vehicle for expansion
of the taxpayer's business interests. 2°1 The Commissioner attacked the
arrangement as an anticipatory assignment of income, even though
the taxpayer executed novations with existing customers substituting
2
the corporation for the taxpayer. 02
The court rejected the assignment-of-income attack on grounds
that the novations worked a transfer of property rights, rather than

a mere assignment of future income.23 More important, however, was
the Court's view that it should not use the assignment-of-income doctrine as a "broad-scale disregard of the corporate form" when less
intrusive legal bases, such as section 482, are available.24 In remanding
the decision for reconsideration under section 482, the court stated:
Section 482... appears available to allocate among controlled
taxpayers . . . [income, deductions, or credits] to prevent
evasion of taxes or to clearly reflect the income of controlled
taxpayers. Other statutory provisions and "common law"
doctrines, structuredfor more limited application,may also
be available to remedy potential tax abuse.205
On remand, the Tax Court applied section 482, reallocating ninetyeight percent of the corporation's taxable income to the taxpayer. 2 w
Although the case again came before the Seventh Circuit in Foglesong
II,m the Foglesong I decision only altered the Tax Court's section
482 holding as it relates to a sole shareholder who works exclusively
8
for his corporation.20
of National Securities Corp. v. Commissioner. 137 F.2d 600 (1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 794
(1943).
199. 621 F.2d 865 (7th Cir. 1980).
200. Id. at 869.
201. Id. at 866-68.
202. Id. at 870.
203. Id. at 870-71, 873.
204. Id. at 869, 872.
205. Id. at 872 (emphasis added).
206. Foglesong v. Commissioner, 691 F.2d 848, 850 (7th Cir. 1982).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 851. The Court carved out an exception to section 482's otherwise broad appli-
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The Seventh Circuit, in Foglesong I, required an item-by-item
reallocation of income and expense under section 482 rather than the
wholesale disregard of the taxpayer's chosen business structure sought
by the commissioner. 2 0 In so doing, the court rejected application of
the assignment-of-income doctrine without evidence of a sham transaction when a remedy with a less intrusive effect existed. Thus, the
court recommended deferring to judicial doctrines over section 482
only when the perceived tax abuse is the result of a sham or fraudulent
structure.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In the case of a controlled corporate agent, there are essentially
three federal income tax issues. The first, whether the alleged agent
is a viable taxable entity, turns upon the presence of a business purpose
or activity. The second, whether the corporation is a genuine agent,
should depend upon the economic reality of the alleged arrangement.
The third issue, concerning the determination of the true taxable income of a controlled corporate agent, is essentially a section 482 concern.
The first issue, as long as it is distinguished from the other two,
should seldom cause uncertainty for taxpayers. The amount of activity
required to satisfy the viability issue is so minimal that most corporations in the controlled corporate agent context will be separate taxable
entities under Moline Properties. The second issue, addressed most
recently by the Bollinger Court and almost forty years ago by the
National Carbide Court, will continue to cause uncertainty with respect to the requisite amount of state law indicia of agency. Therefore,
courts should take an approach similar to the Seventh Circuit's analysis
in FoglesongI in controlled corporate agent cases. Once a court determines that the corporation has a separate taxable status and a bona
fide business purpose for the agency relationship, the focus ought to
be whether the transactions between the related parties truly reflect
taxable income, a section 482 analysis. Such an analysis requires arm'slength charges, thereby reducing the risk that the taxpayer will use
the arrangement to manipulate income. Moreover, despite the Bollinger Court's apparent rejection of any requirement of arm's-length
fees in the controlled corporate agent context, section 482 continues
to lurk in the background.

cation for shareholders who work exclusively for their corporations. Id. The Internal Revenue
Service has not accepted this exception. Rev. Rul. 88-8, 1988-21 I.R.B. 11.
209. Id. at 872.
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